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On April ll, 2011, it became illegal in France to hide the female face in a public space.
The law did not ban burkas specifrcally, but rather, it banned all garments which cover the eyes.
However, scarves, hats and sunglasses are excluded from the law, thereby causing the law to be
commonly referred to as the "burka ban."t
Burkas, as well as niqabs, are banned under the French law.The burka (also spelled
"burqa") thoroughly covers the face and body ofthe person wearing it, leaving only a mesh-like
screen to see through. The niqab is a veil in the truest sense, covering everything below the
bridge of the nose and the upper cheeks (and sometimes also covering the forehead).2
Under the French law, the hijab, which is a scarf used to cover the hair, neck and
sometimes the shoulders, is permissible, as is the full body cloak, as long as it is not covering the
face (the full body cloak is what Muslim women are required to wear outdoors in Iran, a country
that is well known lor its strict Sharia law).r
Critics of the French law, including Muslims, as well as some feminist groups, are
opposed to the law, claiming it is discriminatory and that it impedes on the religious freedom of
Muslim women in France.a However, Muslim women are not singled out by France's religious
intolerance. France has a century-long history of laicitd (French for "secularism") and egalitarian
values, which form a foundation of French society.s Christians, Jews and Sururis have all had
their freedom of religious expression curtailed in France, thanks to a series of French laws that
ban outward expression of religion6. The burka ban simply follows suit in the laws of a deeply
1 Britton D. Davis, Lifting the Veil: Fronce's New Crusade 34 BosroN CoLLEGE INTERNATToNA|- AND CoMpARAlvE LAw
REVTEw 117,118 (2011).
' ld. at !18.
3 Peter Allen, Burko Ban. New French Law Forbids lslomic Women From Weoring Full-Foce veils in Pubtic (but the
only reol protest is in London) Aptil11, 2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1375781.
o td.
s Davis, supro note 1, at 118.5 Ahlul Bayt News Agency, Col! for Muslim Veil Bon in French lJniversities, August 7, 2013.
http://www.abna.irldata.asp?lang=3&id=449696.
secular French society that also bans crosses, Jewish skullcaps and Surmi turbans from being
wom in schoolsT.
Conversely, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects freedom of
religious expression, as do federal laws and numerous federal court rulings. The United States
Supreme Court has ruled that for a law to be upheld that curtails religious freedom, there must be
a compelling state interest at issue, and the law in question must bear a direct correlation to that
interest.s Ifa plaintiff can show that a law or govemmental practice burdens the free exercise of
religious beliefs, the burden shifts to the govemment to prove that the law or practice is
important to the accomplishment of some important or "compelling" secular objective and that
it is the least restrictive means for attaining that objective.o There have been numerous cases
wherein specifics of this standard have been tested and determined, but the common thread of
those cases is that in order for a law that impedes freedom of religion to remain valid, it cannot
single out any religion for special or substandard treatment, it cannot be overly broad and it
carurot be underinclusive. I o
Accordingly, laws in the United States affecting Muslim women have been upheld only
because a compelling state interest has been determined to exist and the law at issue has been
directiy conelated to that interest. Ifthere is a compelling state interest but there is a way to word
or enforce the law so that it does not curtail religious freedom, then that less-discriminatory
7 camille Rustici, France Burqo Bdn Tokes Effect: Two women Detained (Ap(il LL, 2077)'
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/11/france-burqa-ban-takes-ef-n-847366.htm1.
3 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave. v- city of Hialeah, 508 U.s. 520, 521 (1993)-
e Ioanna Tourkocho riti, The Burko Ban: Divergent Approdches to Freedom of Religion in Fronce ond in the US,
20 WTLLTAM AND MARY Brt[ oF Rrs. ]. 791, 815, n. 151.
10 See Church of Lukumi Bobolu Ave.,508 U.s. at 521.
method must be utilized". Unfortunately, at times, there are no other options and the law as it is
written must stand.
Although laws in the United States and France are at nearly opposite ends of the
spectrum relating to religious expression, one thing they do have in common is that neither gives
disparate treatrnent to Muslim women. On the surface, this may seem difficult to believe, but as
the laws and the history of the countries are examined, it becomes clear that Muslim women are
not discriminated against by French laws, nor are they discriminated against by American laws.
I. Laws in the United States Do Not Discriminate
Against Muslim Women
Sharia which means "path" in Arabic 
- 
governs many aspects of Muslim life and
influences the legal code in a majority of Muslim countries. There are many interpretations of
what "Sharia" means, but in some countries strict interpretations "are used to justifu cruel
punishments such an amputation and stoning as well as unequal treatment of women in
inheritance, dress and independence," according to the Council on Foreign Relations.12
Sharia has gained a toehold in some westem countries, notably Great Britain, where five
Sharia courts have been established to settle certain disputes among Muslims, with the
govemment's blessing. Il
In 2010, Oklahoma attempted to become the first state in the nation to ban state judges
lrom relying on Islamic law known as Sharia when deciding cases. The state attempted to do so
through an amendment to their state constitution, a referendum for which was placed on a ballot.
The amendment was referred to as "Save Our State" and it read, in applicable part:
" td.t2 Joel Siegel, tslomic Shdriq Low to be Banned in Oklohomo (June 14, 2OlOl.
h^ttp://abcnews.go.com/US/Media/oklahoma-pass-laws-prohibiting-islamic-sharia-laws-apply/story?id=10908521.
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that
deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It
makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids
courts from considering or using intemational law. It forbids courts from
considering or using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the
conduct of intemational organizations and independent nations, such as
countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It
also deals with some of their relationships with other persons. The law of
nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of
intemational law also include intemational agreements, as well as heaties.
Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the
Koran and the teachings of Mohammed. Shall the proposal be approved?'*
The voters had a choice ofeither "yes" or "no". Seven out often voted "yes".l5
In a challenge to the law brought by Muneer Awad of the Council of American-Islamic
Relations, a federal judge struck down the law as unconstitutional, saying it violated the rights of
Muslims. A federal appeals court upheld the ruling, and the law was never implemented. The
appeals court said supporters of the law "do not identiff any actual problem the challenged
amendment sought to solve. lndeed, they admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing they did
not know ifeven a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia Law or used the
legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had resulted in
concrete problems in Oklahoma."''
While there had not, to date, been an instance of courts enforcing or even considering
Sharia law in Oklahoma, there have been several instances in which courts in other states
considered Sharia law, which is what led proponents of the Save Our State measure to draft the
amendment. Some examples of such rulings are:
to Michael Kirkland, tslomic Low in IJS Courts (May 19, 2013).
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/05/19/Under-the-US-supreme-Court-lslamiclaw-in-US-courts/UPl-
6448 13 68948600/#ixzz2 exLoZ2oO.
" td.
'u ld.
Joohi Q. Hosain v. Anwar Malik, Sharia law of Pakista& Maryland, 1996:
Trial and appellate courts upheld foreign Sharia law and denied mother
custody. She lost custody because going to custody hearing in Pakistan would
have risked prison, torture or execution.; Laila Adeeb Sawaya Malak v. Abdul,
Shariah law of Lebanon/UAE, Califomia, 1986: Appellate court upheld foreign
Sharia law and denied mother custody, reversing trial court; Parveen Chaudry
v. M. Hanif Chaudry, M.D., Shaia law of Pakistan, New Jersey, 1978:
Appellate court upheld foreign Shariah law, overtumed trial court. Wife denied
support and child support and division of property; prenuptial agreement
signed_by parents giving her only $1,500 from maniage upheld by appellate
court.' '
Opponents of the Save Our State amendment cite other religions that have their own
judicial system of sorts. For example, the Roman Catholic Church has an estimated 200 diocesan
tribunals nationwide, which handle cases such as religious annulments. However, a Catholic
tribunal applies to Catholic Church law on1y, and it has no application in the rest of society. For
example, if a person obtains a divorce or civil annulment from a state cowt, that person is
thereby divorced or annulled, as the case may be, according to state law. The catholic church
does not believe in divorce, so if that person had been married in a catholic church, he may nor
be married again in a Catholic Church without having his first maniage annulled through the
church.l8 The Catholic annulment must be subsequent to the state law proceeding in which the
marriage is legally dissolved. Accordingly, one cannot obtain a Catholic arurulment without
being legally divorced (or civilly annulled) first.le However, if that person does not wish to have
his marriage annulled through the church, then he is welcome to get married again outside ofthe
church, and the church has no say in the matter. In that instance, there is a true seoaration of
church and state.
"-Ki(kland, supro note 14, citirg American public policy Alliance.
'" Jon Jakoblich, Diyo rce, Annulments ond Remorrioge (no date listed).
http://www.aboutcatholics.com/beliefs/divorce-annulments-and-remarriage.
'" ld.
Conversely, what concemed seven out of ten citizens in Oklahoma was the idea that the
separation of church and state could be diminished, as it appeared to be in the cases cited above.
In those cases, Sharia law was considered in state court, and the state court ruling was directly
affected because of that consideration.
Orthodox Jews sometimes use rabbinical courts to obtain religious divorces, but they take
it a step further than Roman Catholic tribunals, in that rabbinical courts may also resolve
business disputes and settle other disputes among fellow Orthodox Jews' Once again, there is a
stark contrast between Orthodox Jews submitting to the ruling of a rabbinical court and Sharia
law being considered in state couts. The difference is that Orthodox Jews are voluntarily
permitting the rabbinical court to settle their dispute, which is akin to a private arbitration.20
Most importantly, any party may elect not to participate in rabbinical court and instead litigate
the matter in state or federal court.zl
Because of rising concerns over foreign or religious laws impeding state courts,
legislatures in at least 32 of the 50 states introduced bills from 2010 to 2012 to limit
consideration of foreign or religious laws in state court decisions. Of the approximately 92 such
bills that were introduced nationwide, only 2l mentioned Sharia law specifically'22
During those two years, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, South Dakota and Tennessee
enacted such bills, which remain valid, because they are more neutral than the Oklahoma
amendment and they do not cite religious laws (including Sharia law) in particular2l. The
American Public Policy Alliance supports such bans and has drafted sample legislation, which
has been used in an estimated 7l pieces of legislation nationwide. It reads:
20 Beth Dinn of Ame.ica, Rules ond Procedures. http://bethdin.org,/docs/PDF2-Rules-and-Procedures.pdf.
,, ld,
'?2 Kirkland, supra note 14, cit ng The Pew Forum on Religious and Public Life'
" ld.
Any court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency ruling or decision
shall violate the public policy of this state and be void and unenforceable if the
court, arbitration or tribunal or administrative agency bases its rulings or
decisions in the matter at issue in whole or in part on any law, legal code or
system that would not grant the parties affected by the ruling or decision the
same fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the U.S. and
[Statej constitutions, including but not limited to due process, freedom of
speech or press, and any rigll ofprivacy or marriage as specifically defined by
the constitution of this state."
Critics of these bills argue that they violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, that their purpose is bigoted and that they burden the practice of religious faith.25
Currently, in the United States, laws that burden religious freedom or practice are held to
the "strict scrutiny" standard of review. Strict scrutiny has a two prong test: (l) is there a
compelling govemment interest in the law at issue; and (2) is the law necessary to achieve that
compelling interest. The threshold question applied to such cases is whether the end sought is
sufficiently important to justift the harm to the affected group. In strict scrutiny cases, the law
must be the least restrictive altemative available.26
A. Our Nation's Legal History
In order to understand freedom of religion in the United States, it is important to look
back at the judicial history of our developing country to determine how religious freedoms have
been both challenged and protected overthe years.2twe now have a strict scrutiny standard of
review for cases that impede on religious freedom, but that was not always the case. The road to
get where we are now was fraught with challenge, and at times, ambiguity; and through it all,
there was a whole lot of controversy.
'o td., citing American Public policv Alliance.
'?s (no author listed) rhe Eest of o Bad Lot: Compromise ond Hybrid Religious Exemptions,l23 HARV. L. REV. 1494,
n.1(2010).
ft 
_Church of Lukumi Bobolu Ave. v. City of Hioteoh, SO8 U.S. at S78.
'' A brief explanation of landmark decisions is provided to delineate the ideology of the United states supreme
court throughout our nation's history. some of the cases were overturned by subsequent decisions.
The crucial inquiry has always been distinguishing between acts dictated by
religious precepts-which can be protected as dictated by a religious
normative system competing to the one imposed by the state-and those
that other countervailing considerations render unjustifiable. What justifies
the protection is the idea that religious obligations are a form of imperative
moral obligations; in other words, there seems to be a conflict of moral
duties in this case. Although very sensitive to the protection of freedom of
religion, the Supreme Court^has not gone as far as accepting polygamy on
the basis olreligious belief.'o
ln Reynokls v. United States,2e the United States Supreme Court upheld bigamy laws
upon a challenge from Mormons, who claimed that polygamy is a religious duty. The rationale
for this decision was that Congress may reach actions in violation of social duties or good order.
The Cout held that polygamy leads to a patriarchal principle, which, when applied to large
communities, fetters people in stationary despotism. The Court went on to rule that laws may not
interfere with belief and opinion. but they may interfere with practice; and "to permit this would
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect, permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Govemment could exist only in name
under such circumstances."30 This ruling has never been overtumed; and thus, polygamy is still
illegal.
The underlying rationale in Reynolds applies to Sharia law-, as well. Just as Mormons are
welcome to practice their faith so long as that practice does not violate social duty or good order'
and just as Catholics must obtain a civil divorce or annulment rather than just a religious one,
Muslims are welcome to practice their faith, but they are not permitted to place Sharia law above
state or federal law.
'28 Tourkochoriti, suprd note 9, at 815, nn 747-L42.
2e Reynolds v. United states, 98 U.s. 145 (1878).
'o td. at l6i.
ln Braunfeld v. Brown"', the Supreme Court upheld "Blue Laws", which mandated that
stores close on Sundays. The challenge was brought by an Orthodox Jew, who argued that
because his Sabbath was Saturday, if the State forced him to close on Sundays, he would be
placed at such a severe disadvantage that he would be put out of business. The Court rejected this
claim, because Sunday closings did not force the challenger to embrace a religion, nor did they
hold him criminally responsible for the practice of his religion. The Blue Laws only made the
practice of his religion more expensive. The Court went on to say that there are secular reasons
for Blue Laws, and to strike legislature which has only an indirect burden on religion would
radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. "lt cannot be expected, much less
required, that legislators enact no laws regulating conduct that may, in some way, result in
economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others because ofthe various practices
of different rel igions."l2
On the complete opposite end of the spectrum is the matter of Sherbert v. Verner33,
(which cunently applies to federal law but not state law), which was brought by a person who
was fired from herjob because she refused to work on Saturday, because it was her Sabbath. The
state argued that if an employee was permitted to collect unemployment benefits for that reason,
the state would be open to a multitude of fraudulent claims. The United States Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the employee, and held that a person who gets fired because Saturday is her
Sabbath is entitled to unemployment benefits; and the state may not apply eligibility provisions
so as to constrain a worker to abandon her religious convictions respecting a day of rest.sa The
Court distinguished this case from Braunfield, because in that case, it was determined that there
31 Braunfeld v. Brown,366 U.5.599 (1961).t' Id.at 606.
33 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
'o rd.at 4Lo.
was a compelling state interest in providing a uniform day ofrest for employees. ln Sherbert,the
Court ruled that the state failed to show there was no alternate method to battling fraudulent
claims.35
Sherbert was followed in a string of subsequent cases: Thomas v. Review Board,36
wherein the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job in a munitions
factory because of his opposition to war; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm 37 , where the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a person whose religious views changed during her
employment, which caused her to lose herjob when she would no longer work on her Sabbath;
and Frazee v. Ill. Emp. Security Dept,38 wherein the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a person
who held Sabbath even though he was not part of a specific church. The Court held that his
belief was sincere and religious in nature, so his claim was valid under sherbert.
.,The supreme court has held that ways of life may be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation if they are rooted in religious belief and not only on purely secular
considerations. The rights of the Amish community to educate its members and to instill in them
a way oflife, which is different from the one taught in public schools, was considered significant
enough to outweigh the state interest to compulsory high school education for its citizens,"3e in
the matter of Wisconsin v. Yotler.ao ln Yoder, the United States Supreme Court determined that
Wisconsin's interest in universal education failed under the stfict scrutiny standard of review'
Yoder was centered on an Amish family's challenge to a Wisconsin state law that required
children to attend high school. The Court ruled in favor of the Amish family, holding "only those
15 
she rbe rt, 37 4 lJ.s. at 4o7 .
t" Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.s. 707 (1981)
3t Hobbie u. UnemploYment Appeals Comm., 480 U.s. 136 (1987)'
tt Frazee v. lll. Emp. SecuritY Dept, a89 U.s. 829 (1989)'
3e Tourkochoriti, supro note 9, at 8L3
e wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205 (L9721.
10
state interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance claims of free
exercise."al The Court based this decision on the determination that the Amish way of life was
not merely a personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized
group and intimately related to daily living.a2
One expert testified, that compulsory secondary schooling could "ultimately result in the
destruction of the Old Order Amish church commrmity as it exists in the United States."a3
Conversely, counsel for Wisconsin argued that the Amish way of life fostered ignorance; but that
claim failed, because the Court held that the Amish community has been a highly successful
social unit, whose members are productive and law-abiding.oo The State further argued that
children may choose to leave the Amish community, and then would be ill-equipped for life
outside of that community. This claim also failed, because the Court found it to be highly
speculative. The Court went on to say that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the
Amish qualities of reliability, self-reliance and dedication to work would fail to find ready
markets.a5 Overall, the Court determined that it was incumbent on the State to show with more
particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely
affected by granting an exception to the Amish.ab
Although the United States Supreme Court granted an exception to the Amish with
regard to compulsory education, they refrained from granting the Amish an exception from
paying Social Security tax, in the matter of (lnited States v. Lee.47 ln Lee, an Amish employer
claimed that he should be exempted from paying Social Security tax for his employees on
ot Yoder, 406 Ll.S. at 21.5.
o' td,at 276.
43 ld.at 272.
* td.at236.
ot Id.aL 224.
46 td.at 296.
o' United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (tgl2l.
11
religious grounds, because the Amish believe that it is sinfirl not to provide for their own elderly.
In this case, the heightened scrutiny standard of review applied (rather than strict scrutiny),
because the act ofpaying taxes does not impede one's ability to practice his religion. Therefore,
the State was charged with justifying a limitation on religious liberfy by showing that the act of
paying Social Security tax was essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.a8
The United States Supreme Court determined that mandatory participation in the Social
Security system was indispensable to the fiscal viability of the system, and therefore the State's
burden had been met.ae Yoder was distinguished in Lee becatse "it would be diffrcult to
accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a
wide variety of religious beliefs."s0
At times, the United States Supreme Court has been faced with the very complex
question of whose rights shall prevail as the most indispensable. In such instances, where
religion and race have been at odds. the Court has ruled against granting a religious exception.
Such was the case of Bob Jones Univ. v. Llnited Stalet i1 wherein the IRS denied a tax exemption
to educational institutions that engaged in race discrimination, even though said institutions
claimed the discrimination was required by their religious beliefs. The Court held that there is an
overriding State interest in eliminating racial discrimination.
Deference to military regulations was placed above the right to free exercise in the matter
of Goldman v. Weinberger,s2wherein an Orthodox Jewish air force clinical psychologist
challenged a disciplinary action against him for wearing a yarmulke, in violation of military
dress regulations. The United States Supreme Court held that deference to military regulations
aB Lee, 455 U.s. at 257.
o" Id.al264.
to ld,
tt Bob Jones univ. v. united states,461 u.s. 574 (1983).
52 Goldman v. Weinberyet,475 U.s. 503 (1986)
L2
overrode an Orthodox Jew's right to wear a yarmulke; and the interest in subordinating personal
preferences to the group mission was sufficient to place military protocol above deference to
religion.
The State's interest overrode that of free exercise in Lyng v. Nl4/ Indian Cemetery
Protection lssn.,53 when American Indian tribes challenged the Forest Service's plan to build a
road and permit timber harvesting in an area of forest considered sacred and utilized by Indian
tribes for religious purposes. The United States Supreme Court rationalized this decision by
stating that government cannot operate if it is required to satisfy everyone's religious needs. The
First Amendment applies to everyone equally and citizens cannot veto public programs that do
not prohibit religion.sa The land at issue in this case belonged to the govemment, not the tribes.
Therefore, the tribes could not prohibit the government from utilizing its own land. Strict
scrutiny did not apply in this case, since the action at issue was being taken by the govemment,
rather than the govemment ordering a citizen to act.
In 1990, the very controversial case of (Jnemployment Division v. Smithss was decided.
The respondents in the case were fired from their employment because they ingested peyote for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American church, of which both were
members. When they applied for unemployment benefits, they were rejected, since they were
fired for "misconduct". Respondents based their argument on the precedent set by sherbert,
Thomas and Hobbie, in which the Court held that "a State could not condition the availability of
unemployment insurance on an individual's right to forego conduct required by his religion."56
:" Lyng v. NW Indian Cemetery protection Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988).54 td. at 4s2.
ss Unemployment Division v. Smith,494 U.S. 872 (1990).
"" td.at 876.
The Court distinguished the earlier cases because "the conduct at issue in those cases was
not prohibited by law."5i Since it was unla*4ul to use peyote, even for religious purposes, in
Oregon, the question presented in the case became whether that prohibition was lawful under the
Free Bxercise Clause. The Court determined that the peyote ban was a neutral law of general
applicability, and thus was subject to a rational basis review, rather than a strict scrutiny review.
Under the "rational basis test", there is a two prong criteria: (1) does the government have a
legitimate interest; and (2) is the law a rational way to achieve that interest?s8
The Court held that the use of forbidden substances in religious rituals could not be
protected by the First Amendment. Thns, Smith appears to reaffirm the principle of equal
treatment between religion and non-religion, unless, as the Court insists, the religiously
motivated action involves "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press..."se "In an effort to make the central
holding of smith appear consistent with precedent, the smith majority explained away certain
prior free exercise cases in which the Court had held that religious objectors were entitled to an
exemption from a generally applicable law."60 The Court instead distinguished them from this
case on the ground that they had involved a "hybrid situation", in which the free exercise right
was combined with some other constitutional claim.6l "The present case does not present such a
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or
parental right.'62
" td.
t" ld.at87g.
5e Tourkochoriti, su pro note 9, at 816, nn. 157-158.
@ James G. Dwvet, The Good, the Bod ond the Llgty of Employment Division v. smith for Fomily Law, 32 coRDozo L
REv. 1782 (2011).
61 123 Hrnv. L. Rrv. L494, supro note 25, at L495.
ut smith, +9+ u.s. at 882.
L4
The Court likewise distinguished the seminal case of Sherbert v. Verner as
having involved a unique context: because eligibility for unemployment
compensation was based on a statutory "good cause" standard 
- 
which
necessarily required a case-by-case "governmental assessment of the
reasons for the relevant conduct"- a "mechanism for individualized
exemptions" was already in place in such cases. Accordingly, the state
could not then "refuse to exlqnd that system to cases of'religious hardship'
without compelling reason-"o'
The Court compared the respondents' conduct in Srziti to that ofpolygamy, as decided in
Reynolds, because both involved conduct which was illegal. However, even though both actions
were illegal, the Court refrained from deciding Szitft quite as absolutely as it decided Reynolds.
ln Reynolds, the Court held that it was permissible for Congress to prohibit polygamys; and in
doing so, polygamy became illegal nationwide. ln Smith, the Court held that states could, if they
chose to, permit peyote to be consumed during religious exercise; however, states were not
compelled to do so. The Court ruled that ultimately, the determination whether to carve out a
religious exception should be left to the political processes ofeach state.65
B. The Current Standard in Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Just three years after the Szitl holding, the Supreme Court decided the case of Church of
Lukumi Bsbalu Ave. v. City of Hialeah.66 Lukumi is the current threshold case in the United
States, and it went further in protecting free exercise than many thought the court ever would.
The religion at the center of Lukumi was Santeria, which involves a high devotion to
spirits (refened to as orishas). Those who practice Santeria believe that orishas are powerful but
not immortal, and they require animal sacrifice for their survival.6T
"'123 HARV. L. REv. 1494, supro note 25, at 1500.
6o Reynolds v. United States,98 U.S. 145 (1878).
" Unemployment Division v. Smith,494 U.S. S72 (1990).
"" Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. S2O (1993).
"' td.at 52s.
In response to the Church of Lukumi Babalu opening in the City of Hialeah, the City
passed Ordinanc e 87 -52, which made it illegal to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture or mutilate
an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption. The Ordinance prohibited slaughter outside of areas designed for slaughterhouse
use. The Ordinance does not specifically mention Santeria, and the City claimed it was enacted
to protect animals. However, at the public meeting wherein the ordinance was discussed,
Santeria was specifically mentioned, and worshippers of the religion were criticized and mocked
by the Town Council.6s
The case made it to the United States Supreme Court, which held that "a law burdening
religious practices that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most
rigorous of scrutiny. . . where govemment restricts only conduct protected by the First
Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial
harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not
compelling."6e The Court determined that the focus should be on the effect of the law in
question, rather than the wording or the motive; and even if the government interest is
compelling, if the law is overbroad or underinclusive, it will not survive judicial scrutiny.
Therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the Church and found the Ordinance to be
unconstitutional.To
The above cases, when read in chronological order (as they are listed herein), show a
judicial system that places free exercise of religion on a very high pedestal. No one religion can
be singled out as unlawful; and over the course of our history, nearly every religion has had its
free exercise curtailed at one point or another, ifa compelling State interest was at issue, and the
* 
church of Lukumi Bobolu Ave.,508 u.s. at 541-542.
u" td. at st6-547 .
to ld.at 579-580.
law in question was essential to that compelling State interest. Overall, the only things that seem
to "win out" over free exercise are things that affect the population as a whole, such as use ofa
highway that the govemment wishes to build, social security for the elderly, deference to the
military and national security
In the wake of the September I 1, 2001 attacks on America, national security has at times
been at odds with individual rights. This issue was the center of much debate when Florida
revoked the driver's license of a Muslim woman named Sultaana Freeman, because she was
wearing a niqab, covering all but her eyes, in the photo identification. The State asked Ms.
Freeman to have her photo retaken, with her face visible, and she refused. As a result of that
refusal, the State revoked her driver's license.Tl
Ms. Freeman sued the state of Florida, claiming it would violate her Islamic beliefs to
show her face publicly. Assistant Attomey General Jason Vail argued that Islamic law has
exceptions that allow women to expose their faces if it serves a public good, and that
arrangements could be made to have Freeman photographed with only women present, to allay
her concems about modesty. Prosecutors also argued that allowing people to cover all but their
eyes in their identification photos could allow terrorists to hide their identities.T2
The Florida court determined that it would set a dangerous precedent to make a religious
exception to the law, because the precedent may be exploited by criminals or terrorists. While
acknowledging that Freeman herself "most likely poses no risk to national security,', the court
ruled that if full-face coverings were permitted in identification photos, some people might
pretend "to ascribe to religious beliefs in order to carry out activities that would threaten lives"
'' The Associated Prcss, Muslim womon in Florida Connot Weor Veil in Drive/s License photo,.Judge Rules (lune 6,
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and "it would be foolish not to recognize that there are new threats to public safety, including
both foreign and domestic terrorism."Tl
Interestingly, Florida is not alone in requiring motorists to have a photo identification in
which their full face is shown. In many states, including California, drivers me permitted to wear
a head scarf in their identification photo, but they are not permitted to cover their face.Ta
Although many states have laws similar to the Florida law discussed above, there have
been very few challenges to those laws. What made the Florida case unique was that Florida
openly acknowledged that the law was being strictly enforced due to the September 11, 2001
attacks against the United States, and the Muslim woman who challenged it claimed that it
violated her right offree exercise. Because of the timing of the case and the fact that Courts must
be sensitive to law abiding Muslims and careful not to enforce an anti-Muslim sentiment, while
also being very cognizant of the security threats facing our country, tlis case became national
news.
It is important to understand the evolution of legal precedent in the United States when
determining whether Ihe Freeman case was correctly decided. when reading thlough the
chronology of cases provided herein (which, admittedly, are only a small percentage of the
precedent-setting landmark cases that involve free exercise), it becomes apparent that the Courts
are careful to protect the First Amendment right to free exercise; and that the right will only be
curtailed when the State's interest in enforcing a law that limits it is compelling' Given the
gravity of our national security crisis, combined with the fact that it is impossible to determine
who is underneath a veil in a photo, the Florida court fairly ruled that the State's interest in
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banning facial coverings in driver's license photos is compelling. Ms. Freeman was not
discriminated against by the State of Florida.
This rationale was summarized perfectly in Llaenrv on CoNsctENcE:
"[T]here has been no massive public outcry against U.S. citizens, residents
and visitors who are Muslims; no public demand that they renounce their
distinctive articles of dresst and no claim that their visible difference from
others, should they refuse to dress 'like everyone else', means that they are
somehow threatening or disloyal. Indeed, both striking and reassuring is the
lack of First Amendment litigation over the rights of Muslims in
America."Ts
The author goes on to discuss lhe Freeman case and states "Here is a case where it seems
entirely reasonable for the religious interest to lose... In any case, the prominence and isolation
of this truly difficult case show the basic sanity of the U.S. situation conceming Muslim dress
and other visible signs of Muslim difference."76
Muslims have not been singled out by American laws. That is apparent by the oklahoma
amendment being struck down by the courts, and it is further apparent by a reading ofour legal
precedent, wherein free exercise rights regarding numerous religions have been considered and
rejected for a multitude of reasons, but only when the State's interest overrides that of the
individual. These laws and the ways they are interpreted are in no way unique to Muslims; and
thus, Muslim women are not discriminated against by American laws.
II. Muslim Women Who Wear Facial Veils Are Not Singled Out for
Discrimination by French Laws
A. France Has a Deep Rooted History of Secularism, Which Affects All Religions
'" MARTHA C. NussBAUM, LtBERry oF CoNsctENcE 346-347 (2008).
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In 1789, after the French Revolution, the French government reorganized the Catholic
Church, and seized the Church's assets. Then, in 1795, a new law passed, formally sepamting the
Church from the govemment of France. On the surface, France's 1795 law may appear similar to
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.tt Ho*euer, France's law goes much
further in demanding secularism than does the United States Constitution, because it includes a
prohibition on wearing religious clothing or omaments in public.78
In the 1880s, France secularized public school education, thereby replacing Catholic
dominance in with a secular outlook. Since then, there has been no religious instruction in public
schools and organized prayer has been prohibited.Te Private parochial schools, however, are not
presently outlawed in France; so if parents wish for their child to receive a religious education,
they may attend a parochial school; a choice which approximately 20 percent of parents make
(approximately 95 percent ofthose parochial schools are Catholic).80
Catholic schools, while fairly prominent nowadays, were not always permitted in France.
In 1904, prime Minister Emile Combes initiated a law that restricted all religious communities
from providing education. Approximately 30,000 members of Catholic ordets were expelled
from France.8l The law was modified in 1905, after Prime Minister Combes was forced to resign
due to a scandal. The 1905 law was by no means kind to religion, but at least Catholics were no
longer being exiled. However, under the 1905 law, the French state largely controlled the
Catholic Church. The State changed the structure of the Church hierarchy, it banned the state
funding of religion (and as a result over 40,000 priests ceased to be paid) and other than those
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built solely with private funds, any church built prior to 1905 became public property.
Accordingly, religious organizations needed the State's permission to utilize their own buildings.
Furthermore, the new law isolated the use of religious symbols to places of worship, museums
aad cemeteries.E2
France enacted a new constitution in 1946, wherein secularism was a key component; and
the Preamble to the Constitution stated, in applicable part: "The provision of free, public and
secular education at all levels is a duty of the State."83 The French Episcopate then went on to
explain that there was, according to the State, acceptable secularism and unacceptable
secularism. Summarily, it was stated that the state was autonomous, but there was to be religious
liberty. Conversely, atheism and materialism were said to be unacceptable.sa
In 1959, the Debre Law was passed, wherein public financial support for private schools
was maintained, so long as the private schools met certain criteria.8s
Unlike the United States, France has excluded religious symbols from all areas of public
life: when an oath is taken in France, the person taking the oath does not place a hand on the
bible; French money does not say anything akin to "In God we Trust" and there is no French
pledge that references God. So, for France to outlaw outward manifestations ofreligious belief is
not "out ofleft field"; instead, it is quite in line with French history.s6
In october 1989, the principal of a public high school in creil, France expelled three
Muslim female students because they were wearing headscarves. A Council of the State was
appointed to determine the appropriateness of the expulsions; and they issued an opinion that
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wearing a headscarf was not incompatible *ith taiciti (secularism).87 However, the final decision
on their appropriateness was to be made on a case-by case basis. Between 1992 and 1999, the
Council overturned 4l expulsion cases and upheld eight of them.88 To ovemrle the Council,
supporters ofthe headscarf ban pressed for a new law on secularism.
Lai:citd is a philosophy in France which delineates the relationship between church and
state. It is a revered concept that signifies freedom to the French, much like the word
"democracy" is respected in the United States.8e The French believe that idi?iti protects their
culture from the pressures of minority groups, particularly when the group is religious in
nature.9o
In 2004, France passed a law known as the "secularity law", which states, in Article I: "In
public primary, secondary and high schools, the wearing of signs of dress with which the
students manifest ostentatiously a religious affiliation is prohibited.'er Large Christian crosses or
crucifixes, hijabs, Sikh head coverings and yarmulkes were banned in schools, pursuant to the
ne* law.q2 The 2004 law was an attempt to strike a balance between the deeply held principle of
laicird and freedom of conscience.es The French history of forbidding overt religious expression
was created because outward manifestation of religious beliefs has been, and still is, considered
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an affront to French culture.ea In the modem era, lai:citd largely defines the comerstone ofFrench
culture and the public identity of the French people.qs
B. The "Burka Ban"
France took this a step further in September 2010, when the French Senate voted 246 to 1
in favor of a bill banning the burka-style Islamic veil everywhere from post offices to streets.
The bill is believed to affect approximately 2,000 Muslim women residing in France; however, it
also applies to women visiting France. Proponents of the law argue that: (1) it protects women
and young girls from being forced to cover their faces by males in their family, (2) lslam does
not requirc a woman to cover her face and (3) it allows women and young girls to fit in to French
culture and not be singled out as "different."e6
Many Muslim leaders have concurred that Islam does not require a woman to hide her
face. Rather, facial coverings are a Middle Eastem tradition, utilized largely by Muslim
fundamentalists. opponents to burkas and niqabs argue that oftentimes, the covering of a
woman's face is not done with her consent, but instead is forced on her by her father and,/or
husband. Nonetheless, some Muslim leaders, despite openly acknowledging that Islam does not
require a facial veil, have voiced concems that a law forbidding them stigmatizes the French
Muslim population, which, at an estimated five million, is the second largest in France and the
largest in Westem Europe.eT
Interestingly, the fine for an adult woman who wears a facial veil in public in France is
approximately the equivalent to $215; additionally, the woman may be ordered to take
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"citizenship classes". However, if a man is caught forcing a woman to cover her face in public,
he faces a fine of approximately $39,750 and one year in prison; that penalty is doubled if the
female involved is a minor.e8
Those who support the ban argue that it protects Muslim women from being victimized
by males in their family, by being forced to cover their faces. Burka-wearers have wdtten
memoirs which describe how full-face veils cause panic atlacks, anxiety, fears of suffocation,
claustrophobia, depression, low self-esteem and Vitamin D deficiency (due to the lack of
exposure to sunlight) and how a full-face veil is a "sensory deprivation chamber."ee The Koran
mandates that both men and women dress "modestly." Yet, Muslim men in France wear modem,
Western clothing, while almost 2,000 Muslim women wear burkasl00.
On April 12,2011, Dr. Taj Hargey, Imam of the Oxford Islamic Congregation, *rote in
the DArLy Me[ "The decision by the French govemment to outlaw all forms of public face-
masking, including the burka and niqab, is welcome by all thinking Muslims around the
world.',t01 However, not all Muslims agree with Dr. Hargey; and when the burka ban was passed,
protestors gathered outside Notre Dame Cathedral to express their outrage over then French law'
Several people were arrested for protesting without a license; however' no one was arrested
solely for wearing a facial veil.lo2 French police have been instructed not to use force to remove
veils; ifa woman refuses to remove her veil, the police officer is to call a prosecutor for further
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legal action, and only in "very extreme cases" would a woman be jailed for refusal to remove her
veil.l03
France seems to have begun a hend throughout Europe, as similar legislation was enacted
in Belgium; in Denmark, schools and public services are allowed to regulate the wearing of
headscarves by employees; in the Netherlands, new draft legislation is being prepared to ban
burkas and other face coverings; Italy passed a law prohibiting the covering of the face in public
placest0a. There is an exception in the Italian law that applies to coverings for religious reasons,
but members of the Italian Parliament are debating whether to lift it.r05
Although the burka debate seems to be fairly recent, Muslim women successfully fought
against wearing burkas for 100 years in countries such as Egypt, Turkey and Morocco. In 1994,
the Supreme Court of Malaysia prohibited public servants from covering their faces. Their
grounds for doing so included the fact that facial coverings are not required by Islamic law.106
rn 2009, Sheikh Mohammad sayyid rantawi, the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar University
(Sunni Islam's highest institution ofreligious learning) was touring a Cairo high school and saw
a teenage girl wearing a facial veil. He immediately angered and said "The niqab is tradition. It
has no connection to religion." He then instructed the girl never to wear it again, and he issued a
fatwa (religious edict) against its use in schools.l0T proponents of the burka ban cite this story
often and argue that if the grand Sheikh of Sunni Islam's highest institution of religious leaming
is so certain that facial veils are not required by the Koran, then are the women who wear them
being lorced or pressured to do so because of Middle Eastern culture? proponents of the ban
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claim that it does not infringe on religious rights; rather, it is a "blow to the Talibanesque and
barbaric subordination of Muslim women on Westem soil."l08
In 2010, Slria banned full facial veils in certain public places, including universities; and
in 2010, Iraqi religious authorities issued a fatwa requiring courtroom witnesses to appear
unveiled, claiming that only the Prophet Mohammad's wives were obligated to cover their
faces.l@
The cunent worldwide trend clearly appears to be pointing toward a ban on burkas. For
women who are forced to cover their faces against their will, this will be a tremendously
liberating victory. However, for women who truly believe that facial veils are their religious
duty, the laws are downright tragic. As an American who treasures free exercise, any ban on the
outward expression of religion is deeply offensive. However, as a woman who values her
personal freedom and independence from oppression, the idea that Muslim women and young
girls may be forced to cover their faces against their will is enraging. It is seemingly impossible
to find a balance that will protect the rights of Muslim women while also protecting Muslim
women from oppression.
Conclusion
Some women may not believe wearing the full veil is mandatory; but rather, they
consider it an element of a more pious way of life driven by a deep commitment to their faith'
other women believe that the veil is a religious obligation; while for others, it is cultural. The
state is ill-suited to evaluate the theological soundness ofa religious practice. 
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"standard" must apply for evaluating the necessity of the "burka ban". Unfortunately, that
standard is lar from easy to ascertain.
France has determined that secularism is so deep-rooted in French culture that the burka
shall be baru:red based on the secular principles of the country. The 2010 ban follows suit in a
string of secular French laws dating back to the French Revolution and affecting every major
religion in existence. Accordingly, France's burka ban may be open to justifiable criticism, but
one cannot fairly say that Muslim women are singled out for disparate treatnent beyond people
of other faiths who wish to wear outward manifestations of their religious beliefs, since all of
those manifestations, from every religion, are considered to be offensive towards French culture.
Furthermore, Sunni skullcaps and large Christian crosses are banned from being wom in French
schools; therefore, facial veils are not the only religious garment to be prohibited.
Secularism is so deeply rooted in French culture that burkas are viewed as an affront to
the French ideology. In that way, France is drastically different from the United States, which
has stayed true to its First Amendment principles in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks
on America; because while the govemment is trampling all over our privacy rights, our free
exercise rights have been adequately protected. The United States has made no move to outlaw
burkas; and the only concession regarding facial veils at all has been their ban for use in photo
identification. Just as France has stayed true to the deeply held principle of laicitd by birnnrng
burkas, the United States has stayed true to its free exercise ideals by refraining from doing so.
While the two countries are at opposite ends ofthe spectrum with regard to free exercise, neither
singles out Muslim women for disparate treatment.

